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Abstract 
 
Recent work on United Nations peacekeeping operations have begun to examine how 
operational factors may influence the ability of UN missions to help maintain peace in post-
conflict societies.  Some research analyzes mission type and peacekeeping success rates (Doyle 
and Sambanis 2006, Fortna 2008), others the impact of personnel type and strength in numbers 
(Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2016).  A further branch of study considers the diversity of the 
mission personnel, arguing that missions with a more diverse member base can draw on a wider 
“portfolio of skills,” helping to increase their performance effectiveness (Bove and Ruggeri 
2015).  In this paper, we focus on gender dynamics in peacekeeping missions.  Drawing from 
previous theoretical and case study work on women in peacekeeping, we theorize that 
peacekeeping missions with more women will be better able to interact with local populations, 
influence public attitudes towards missions, and maintain greater internal accountability.  
Examining UN peacekeeping missions in Africa from 2006-2010 using the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program and mission-level data on women in UN peacekeeping operations from the UN 
Peacekeeping website, we find that missions containing a higher percentage of female military 
personnel experience a longer duration of peace. Including missions with even a small 
percentage of women serving, we see a significant jump in peace duration compared to missions 
with no women, where the risk of peace failure is much higher. 
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Do Women Peacekeepers Keep Peace? 
An Analysis of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions  
and the Duration of Peace after Civil Conflict  
 
 
 In October 2000, the United Nations (UN) passed Security Council Resolution 1325, a 
resolution considered landmark due to its promotion of the involvement and protection of 
women in peacemaking, humanitarian activity, and conflict resolution.  While it was passed 
amidst growing evidence of gender-based violence in peacekeeping missions (Tryggestad 2009), 
proponents hoped that it would raise awareness of both the sexual violence women often endure 
during conflict and the important roles women may play in conflict mediation.  Resolution 1325 
aimed to increase representation of women at all decision-making levels, mainstream gender 
perspectives in peacekeeping operations, and acknowledge the “important role of women in the 
prevention and resolution of conflicts” (S/RES/1325, paragraph 1).  
In evaluating the success of UN Resolution 1325, the results have been mixed at best.  
Women are beginning to emerge in leadership positions on these missions; in 2014, Major 
General Kristin Lund of Norway was appointed as the first woman to serve as Force Commander 
in a UN mission (Ivanovic 2014).  However, this appointment was to the generally stable Cyprus 
mission; in the worst conflict zones in the world, peacekeeping remains a male-dominated 
position.  To place women’s underrepresentation in peacekeeping under further perspective, 
though women comprise approximately 30 percent of UN general personnel (Karim 2013, 468), 
they only make up ten percent of UN police and three percent of UN military forces (United 
Nations Peacekeeping 2017).  While this is a significant improvement over 1993, when women 
only comprised one percent of UN missions (Ivanovic 2014, para. 5), the reality is that today 
women are generally deployed as civilian support, not as soldiers, law enforcement, or officers. 
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As Resolution 1325 has slowly moved towards its goal of increasing the participation of 
women in UN peacekeeping missions, the ideas behind its promotion are worth investigating.  
For instance, is there evidence that including more women on peacekeeping missions improves 
the success of these missions?  While there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that women 
peacekeepers can improve community connections and population access (Ivanovic 2014; 
Bridges and Horsfall 2009; Hudson 2005), we might expect a more general pattern by which 
peacekeeping missions with greater female representation would actually result in a more lasting 
post-conflict settlement.   
One major benefit of Resolution 1325 is the regular collection and public reporting of 
women’s participation in peacekeeping missions.  Using this monthly data on the percentage of 
women in peacekeeping missions, we combine it with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s 
Conflict Termination Dataset (UCPD-CTD) (Kreutz 2010) to identify African conflicts that have 
seen an end to hostilities.  We also control for a number of conflict-specific and state-level 
factors (such as war duration and severity, regime type, population, and GDP per capita) that 
may influence the duration of peace. We do find that UN peacekeeping missions with more 
women are better than other missions at maintaining peace between combatants. 
Understanding Peacekeeping Effectiveness  
United Nations peacekeepers are often sent to the most difficult of civil conflicts 
(Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2008), with the hope that their multinational peace efforts 
prove more effective than those of individual states’ or local disputants (Fortna 2008). And, 
while earlier work questions the effectiveness of UN missions at maintaining peace (Diehl et al. 
1996), more recent work using more nuanced measures have led to a growing consensus that 
peacekeeping does significantly increase the duration of peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; 
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Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Hultman et  al. 2016).  Overall, the presence of 
UN peacekeepers “has been shown to extend the length of ceasefires, increase the likelihood of 
successful post-conflict democratization, and reduce conflict recidivism,” (Hultman, Kathman 
and Shannon 2014, 738). 
More recent work on UN peacekeeping operations has begun to examine how operational 
factors influence the ability of UN missions to help maintain peace in post-conflict societies.  
Costalli (2013), for instance, examines the local distribution of peacekeeping forces within a 
country, arguing that much of the “failings of peacekeeping” may be attributed to forces being 
sent to the most severe outbreak in violence.  Focusing on the impact of personnel numbers and 
the type of staff positions, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2016) find that increasing the 
number of armed troops is more effective in reducing battlefield hostilities in peacekeeping 
operations and extending the duration of peace.      
Previous work has also suggested that the people who comprise a peacekeeping mission 
also impact how the mission mission operates.  Diversity has been proposed as one such factor, 
and it may play a significant role in determining mission effectiveness in a variety of ways. 
Multinational operations benefit from multiple national budgets and armory resources, 
improving the capacity to carry out peacekeeping efforts. Missions with more diversity in their 
personnel training may also be better at sharing information between conflict parties, helping 
them better uphold peace settlements (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2016).   
As Bove and Ruggeri (2015, 684) argue, missions with a more diverse member base can 
also draw from a wider “portfolio of skills, talents, and interests on which to draw and [facilitate] 
mutual learning,” helping to increase their performance effectiveness.  This benefits both the 
complementarity and monitoring roles of peacekeeping missions.  Complementarity relies on the 
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peacekeepers demonstrating a wide knowledge and resource base in which to interact with local 
situations, while monitoring focuses on internal and external accountability.  As civil wars occur 
and re-occur “as result of information asymmetries and commitment problems between 
combatant factions” (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2016, 234), mission members that 
improve the communicative abilities of a peacekeeping mission are highly valuable.   
How Women (May) Make the Difference on Peacekeeping Missions 
         While women are not necessarily by nature more peaceful than men, there are many 
reasons to think a female perspective would significantly impact a peace process.  As Hudson 
(2005, 792) puts forth,  “women have a different understanding of peace, security, conflict 
resolution, and the use of force given their socially constructed identities and experiences.” 
Including women in the peace process at any level, therefore, improves the multidimensionality 
of the process.  Even if women are limited to serving as token members of a force, the perception 
of gender inclusion may be enough to change the behavior of local populations.  As DeGroot 
(2001) points out, one of the advantages women have in calming situations is that they are 
expected to be peaceful, which alters how people around them respond to provocation.   
 Peacekeeping missions that contain more women may be better able to connect with and 
impact the local community.   In an overview of case studies based on UN missions, Carey 
(2007) highlights how women peacekeepers can shift the dynamics of negotiations.  Local 
women confide more in female peacekeepers and are better able to understand the peace process 
when communicating with female negotiators.  In addition, local women are significantly more 
likely to join peace committees when the proportion of women peacekeepers exceeds a critical 
mass.1  Women may also be better at resolving certain policy problems, as additional research 
has shown that women may have the advantage in addressing health, gender issues, and abuse 
                                               
1 Carey cites a study that lists this critical mass as 30% of mission personnel (2007, 54).  
6 
 
(Reeve 2012).  Through these community relations, women peacekeepers have helped create 
trust towards mission personnel in the host nation (Bridges and Horsfall 2009, 126). 
 Missions with more women may also operate more effectively.  More women on 
missions has been argued to cut down on sexual misconduct by mission personnel (Bridges and 
Horsfall 2009) and may reduce corruption (Transparency International 2013).  Missions with 
more women may also experience more peace within the mission team (Bridges and Horsfall 
2009).  Since missions with less internal problems are better able to concentrate their efforts on 
their missions, we would predict improved operational effectiveness to result in longer post-
conflict peace.  As we expect that peacekeeping missions with more women will be better able to 
interact with local populations, influence public attitudes, and maintain greater operational 
effectiveness, we hypothesize:  
Influence of Women in Peacekeeping: Peacekeeping missions with more women are 
more likely to increase the duration of peace following civil war.  
 
Methodology 
To test this hypothesis, we base our analysis on the work of Hultman et al. (2016), who 
use a Cox proportional hazards model with robust standard errors to examine whether 
peacekeeping mission capacity (measured in the number of troops, police, and observers on each 
mission) increases the duration of peace following a civil war.  We use the same dependent 
variable - peace duration - which is based on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
Conflict Termination Dataset (UCPD-CTD).  This dataset covers all civil wars in which at least 
one of the groups in the conflict was the state government, and allows us to identify civil wars 
and code for the month in which this war ended.  While the full UCPD-CTD dataset begins in 
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1946 and ends in 2013 and is global in scope, Hultman et al. limit their analysis to African civil 
wars ending between 1989 and 2010 (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2016, 238).  
Hultman et al.’s reasoning (p. 238) is primarily data availability, but limiting the analysis 
to Africa has some additional benefits.  It allows us to better control for regional-specific factors, 
and it presents a “hard test” of our theory given that these civil wars are often some of the most 
difficult to resolve.  Finally, as Hultman et al. point out, African civil conflicts see considerable 
variation in peace-keeping mission type, which makes them a good microcosm of global trends.  
Given that data on women’s involvement in UN peacekeeping missions is only available 
beginning in 2006, this further limits our dataset to civil wars ending between 2006 and 2010. 
Hultman et al. also follow the lead of Nilsson (2008) by examining peace as dyadic 
settlements between the government and different rebel groups.2  Therefore, the unit of analysis 
in our dataset is monthly peace data for African civil war conflict dyads from 2006 to 2010, with 
our dataset covering each conflict from the end of their conflict until either the war recurs or we 
reach the temporal end of the dataset. 
Women in Peacekeeping  
  Our main variable of interest is the percentage of women peacekeepers on each mission, 
collected from the United Nations Peacekeeping website (2017).  Gender data are collected 
monthly, and are available from August 2006 through February 2017.  While more recent years 
include data on women as part of police forces, given our already limited time frame, we instead 
focus our analyses on data that has consistently been reported since the beginning of the UN’s 
data collection efforts - women on military observer missions and women who served as troops 
on peacekeeping missions.  We use this to create our variable, Percent Women Peacekeepers.   
                                               
2 Nilsson notes that not only do rebel groups cease fighting at different times, but also that the exclusion of certain 
groups to a peace agreement does not noticeably impact the decision by the signatories to abide by this agreement. 
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Figure 1: The Distribution of Women in UN Peacekeeping Missions  
(Post-Civil War Missions in Africa) 
 
 
 
It is important to note that very few women participate in UN peacekeeping missions.  In 
fact, our data demonstrates that the average proportion of women on a UN peacekeeping mission 
is only 3.4%; most of our monthly data on UN missions finds that over 55% have no women as 
part of their military operations (see Figure 1).   
Control Variables 
For our control variables, we include the mission capacity variables used by Hultman et 
al. (2016).  Given our limited time frame and the analysis difficulties this presents, we simplify 
our analyses and use the only mission capacity variable that consistently shows significant across 
their models - the number of UN troop numbers.   
 We also control for a number of conflict-specific and state-level factors that past 
research finds relate to peace duration.  As longer and more costly conflicts have a more difficult 
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time maintaining peace, conflict duration measures the length of time (in months) of the 
terminated conflict (Fortna 2008).  Previous war deaths are the number of government and rebel 
fatalities, collected from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) (Sundberg and 
Melander 2013).  We also expect the risk of conflict re-emergence to be much higher if the 
government and rebel groups have a shared legacy of failed past peace agreements; for this 
reason, we include a count of the number of past conflict episodes between these groups 
(Hultman et al. 2016).     
Using the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset, we also code the way in which the war 
ended, as past research has shown that civil wars that end with a clear victory - with one side 
often eliminating the military capabilities of the opposing group - tend to have a more durable 
peace than ones that end in stalemate or a negotiated settlement (Fortna 2008).  We include the 
dichotomous victory and negotiated settlement conditions as control variables in our analyses.  
As we might expect that rebel groups that possess a political wing are better prepared to 
transition to post-conflict politics and thus, should extend the duration of peace, we also include 
a dichotomous variable (Rebel political wing) drawn from Cunningham et al. (2009). 
Conflict is also more likely to re-emerge in countries with non-democratic regimes, 
higher populations, and less wealth.  Regime type is measured using the Polity IV dataset 
(Marshall et al, 2011).  As we are borrowing from the Hultman et al. (2016) analysis, we are 
including the 21-point autocracy-democracy scale and square this scale (Polity2) to account for 
the possible non-monotonic effect of regime type on peace duration.  Similarly, we use Hultman 
et al.’s (2016) state population size variable, which is a component part of a country’s CINC 
score in the Correlates of War project (Singer et al. 1972).  As for wealth, we use the GDP per 
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capita data from Gleditsch (2002).  The population and GDP per capita data are both log-
transformed.   
Results and Analyses 
 Table 1 presents the results of our Cox proportional hazards model (with robust standard 
errors).  The Cox hazards model analyzes the probability a case will leave the dataset at a given 
time; in other words, it measures the probability at any given time that the peace process fails 
and conflict re-emerges.  Therefore, the significant coefficients should be interpreted so that 
positive coefficients are associated with shorter peace, and negative coefficients with a longer 
peace.   
 Despite our limited time frame and how few women actually participate in peacekeeping 
missions, the significant and negative coefficient for women peacekeepers means that we do find 
that UN missions in Africa that contain a higher percentage of female military personnel 
experience a longer duration of peace.  This finding holds true even when controlling for overall 
UN troop numbers or when adding many of the controls from the Hultman et al. (2016) study.  In 
other words, with all other factors being equal, more women on peacekeeping missions extends 
the duration of peace following the cessation of conflict between feuding groups.   
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Table 1: Cox duration analysis of the likelihood of conflict re-emergence following civil war  
(Africa, 2006-2010) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
% Women Peacekeepers -7.181*** 
(2.340) 
-7.102* 
(3.800) 
UN Troops -.002*** 
(.001) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
Conflict Duration   .0002 
(.006) 
Previous War Deaths   .0003* 
(.0002) 
GDP per capita   -.171 
(.596) 
Population   .507 
(.397) 
Polity   -.116 
(.101) 
Polity2   .033 
(.027) 
Rebel Political Wing   -.335 
(.911) 
Number of Previous Episodes   .604** 
(.284) 
Negotiated Settlement   -.911 
(.575) 
Victory   .789 
(1.755) 
Observations 
Number of subjects 
Number of failures 
Wald χ2 
Log pseudo-likelihood 
4801 
106 
11 
781.20*** 
-30.445 
4671 
103 
11 
1998.78*** 
-23.676 
Note: Robust clustering of coefficients and standard errors on the conflict dyad.  *** p<.01, ** p< .05, * p<.01 
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 In fact, we see a significant jump in peace duration when we go from no women on the 
mission to even a small percentage of women.  Figure 2 displays the estimates of the smoothed 
hazard function from Model 2, with control variables held at their mean or modal values.  Higher 
numbers on the Y-axis are associated with a higher probability of the conflict re-emerging (in 
other words, the peace failing), accounting for the length of time since the end of the conflict.  
The X-axis represents the amount of time following the end of the conflict.  As seen in the 
Figure below, all three lines decline over time, meaning that the risk of peace failing also 
declines.  In other words, peace has the highest tendency to fail early in the process, but a peace 
process that has gone on for several months becomes more likely to endure.   
 
Figure 2: Smoothed hazard function estimates of post-conflict re-emergence in states with 
varying levels of women deployed as part of peacekeeping missions.   
 
 
Note: Hazard function derived from the analysis in Model 2. 
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The most interesting comparison is between the blue line (no women in the mission) to 
the other two lines (missions that include women in at least a .5% and 1% of their forces).  
Immediately following the end of a conflict, we see that the risk of peace failure is much higher 
for conflicts with no female peacekeepers than missions with even a small percentage of women.   
Turning to our control variables, similar to Hultman et al. (2016), we find that more UN 
peacekeeping troops does result in a longer peace duration, while conflicts that were more deadly 
and have seen more peace failures in the past are at a much higher risk of conflict re-emergence.  
We do not find a significant relationship for any of our other controls, even the ones that 
Hultman et al. (2016).     
Conclusion: Directions for Future Research 
 While the initial results are promising, we do face considerable data issues - specifically, 
a limited time frame for analysis - that limit our ability to make significant claims regarding our 
findings.  To even allow the analysis to run, we had to drop many of the control variables used 
by Hultman et al. (2016) and cited by other authors as important factors determining the success 
or failure of a peace process.  In the future, we would need to temporally and geographically 
extend our analysis in order to collect enough cases to see sufficient variance in failure for us to 
adequately assess our causal relationship.   
We may be able to do this by including non-African civil conflicts and/or by collecting 
data after our original 2010 limitation, though both options pose challenges.  The first option 
may raise questions of comparability, as the dynamics of African conflicts and peacekeeping 
missions may be significantly different than missions in other regions.3  As for the second, one of 
our major controls, GDP per capita, has only been collected until 2011 (Gleditsch 2002), which 
                                               
3 UNFICYP, the UN’s Cyprus mission, stands out as as an obvious outlier.  It has a fairly high involvement of 
women, but is also a “cold” conflict with little chance of hostilities re-emerging.  The UN mission, therefore, is 
considered one of the most favorable missions to be deployed to. 
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is what limits our current analysis to January 2011.  The Gleditsch dataset is unique in that it 
compiles data from a number of different sources to obtain GDP data even in cases when 
traditional data sources (such as the World Bank) would leave as missing.  African countries, 
especially those experiencing an ongoing or recent conflict, are significantly more likely to be 
missing economic data, which necessitates our reliance on a Gleditsch-style data collection 
effort.     
Nevertheless, our findings show promise. While UN peacekeeping missions have been 
recognized as effective in extending the duration of peace following conflict (Forta 2008), the 
specific factors that contribute to operation effectiveness are still being explored (Doyle and 
Sambanis 2006). While previous work has examined troop strength (Hultman, Kathman and 
Shannon 2016) and multinational contributions (Bove and Ruggeri 2015) as factors, this analysis 
pioneers the examination of the specific impact of women peacekeepers.  While it requires 
further study, our initial findings suggest that deploying any women on UN peacekeeping 
operations – even a “token” showing – dramatically improves the chances of peace following a 
civil war.  
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